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TILTING AT WIND TURBINES: NOISE NUISANCE IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER RASSIER V HOUIM
DAVID R. BLISS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most residential property owners have visions of what peace
and tranquillity await them as they take that major financial step
to purchase a parcel of land. They may be prepared to do battle
with runaway lawns, rodents, weeds, and cankerworms, but they
may not expect that other invasions may penetrate their quiet ref-
uge from the stresses and strains of the outside world. These intru-
sions may be termed nuisances. One author has defined a
nuisance as
that class of wrongs that arise either from the unreasona-
ble, unwarrantable, indecent or unlawful use by a person
of his property or from his own improper, indecent or
unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction or
injury to the right of another or the public, and producing
such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or
hurt that the law will presume a consequent damage.'
Nuisance may come from the howls of barking dogs' or the
odor from a hog farming operation.' Noises can also be consid-
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1. 6 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW ON REAL PROPERTY, 866.1[3], at 79B-38 (1991)
(citing Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 19 A.2d 362, 363 (1941)).
2. Parker v. Reaves, 505 So. 2d. 323 (Ala. 1987) (finding noise and odors of dogs that
interfered with neighbors' enjoyment of their homes enjoined as private nuisance);
Brewton v. Young, 596 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 1992) (finding noise and odor of dogs that interfered
with neighbors' enjoyment of their homes enjoined as private nuisance); Wilms v. Hand,
226 P.2d 728 (Ca. 1951) (classifying barking dogs in a dog hospital adjacent to a motel as a
nuisance); Connecticut v. Olson, 511 A.2d 379 (Conn. 1986) (recognizing dogs that bark
excessively as a nuisance); Herberg v. Smyth, 230 A.2d 235 (Conn. 1967) (opining that a dog
kennel with as many as 46 dogs at one time on residential premises constituted common-
law nuisance in view of findings that barking and howling of dogs continued for extended
periods of time and occurred at all hours of the day and night). See also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 42-03-01.
3. Valasek v. Baer, 401 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 1987) (recognizing that the spreading of hog
manure near a neighbor's property can constitute a nuisance even though the nuisance
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ered nuisances,4 such as airplane noise,5 gunshots from a firing
range,6 or the whine and whir of a wind turbine.7 Several types of
nuisances are recognized in the law and are generally classified as
either public or private. Public and private nuisances each impli-
cate different interests and bear little relation to one another,
although each causes inconvenience to someone. Their common
name has led the courts to apply some of the same substantive
rules of law to both types of nuisance."
A private nuisance is categorized as a civil wrong based upon
a disturbance of those rights.9 The remedy against a private nui-
sance belongs to the one whose rights have been violated.' ° In a
public or common nuisance action, however, the rights of the com-
munity at large are affected." Unlike the remedy for private nui-
sances, the remedy for public nuisances is traditionally sought by
the state. 12 An agricultural nuisance can assume characteristics of
either a public or private nuisance. In most western states, an
agricultural nuisance is set apart from the other nuisance defini-
tions since agriculture assumes such an important economic role. 13
statute itself not more specific than to note that offensive smells may be actionable under
nuisance law).
4. "Whether noise constitutes a nuisance depends on all the facts and circumstances of
the case, including the following: the location and surroundings, the character and
magnitude of the industry or business complained of and the manner in which it is
conducted; the character and volume of the noise; the time when occurring, and the
duration thereof; and the number of people affected." 58 AM. JuR. 2D Nuisances § 144
(1989) (citations omitted). "The question whether noise constitutes a nuisance is a relative
one, requiring the weighing of the competing interest and rights of the parties in each case,
and to constitute a nuisance and a disturbance of the peace a noise must be an unreasonable
one in the circumstances or cause material annoyance." Id. (citations omitted).
5. Morris v. Ciborowski, 311 A.2d 296 (N.H. 1973) (finding that airplane overflights
were a permanent nuisance to the enjoyment of the land); Thornburg v. Port of Portland,
376 P.2d 100 (1962) (recognizing that noise from low-level flights over private land was an
actionable nuisance); Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, Thiokol Chem. Corp., 81 A.2d 487
(N.J. 1962) (recognizing that a disturbance by the defendant contracting with the
government for the development and testing of a rocket engine in a supersonic airplane set
forth textbook classifications of nuisances). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-04-02 (1987).
6. Anne Arundel County Fish & Game Conservation Ass'n v. Carlucci, 573 A.2d 847
(Md. App. 1990) (requiring a trap and skeet shooting club to implement noise abatement for
adjoining homeowners in an adjacent residential zone); Kolstad v. Rankin, 543 N.E.2d 1373
(Ill. 1989) (enjoining a gunsmith's private firing range as a nuisance to neighboring homes in
rural agricultural area); Racine v. Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1988)
(finding that a gun club's use of property was nuisance to adjacent property owners).
7. Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1982) (enjoining a wind turbine
which produced noise levels of more than 60 decibels as an unreasonable interference with
the neighbors' quiet enjoyment of their residences).
8. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 33 (1989).
9. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 86, at
618 (5th ed. 1984).
10. Id.
11. Id. Common nuisances include indecent exposure, the operation of public gaming
houses, and the obstruction of public highways. Id.
12. Id.
13. North Dakota's agricultural nuisance chapter provides:
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The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of North
Dakota's public, private and agricultural nuisance statutes with a
specific emphasis upon the private nuisance action in light of the
North Dakota Supreme Court's recent decision in Rassier v.
Houim.'4 The Rassier court apparently interpreted North
Dakota's private nuisance law to mean that violation of an express
statute, regulation or ordinance coupled with the violation of the
state's nuisance law is a significant but not controlling factor to be
considered by the trial court as it weighs the circumstances of each
nuisance case.15 The Rassier decision represents another judicial
tack in the court's policy as to whether a private nuisance action
may be based upon state nuisance law absent the violation of any
other express statute, law, ordinance or regulation.
For the first time, the Rassier court applied the "coming to
the nuisance" doctrine 6 in a nuisance action brought by a residen-
Agricultural operation defined. As used in this chapter, "agricultural operation"
means the science and art of production of plants and animals useful to man, by a
corporation as provided in chapter 10-06, a partnership, or a proprietorship, and
including, to a variable extent, the preparation of these products for man's use
and their disposal by marketing or otherwise, and includes horticulture,
floriculture, viticulture, forestry, dairy, livestock, poultry, bee, and any and all
forms of farm products, and farm production.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-01 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
Agricultural operation deemed not nuisance. An agricultural operation is not,
nor shall it become, a private or public nuisance by any changed conditions in or
about the locality of such operation after it has been in operation for more than
one year, if such operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began;
except that the provisions of this section shall not apply when a nuisance results
from the negligent or improper operation of any such agricultural operation.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
Recovery for water pollution, condition, or overflow. The provisions of section
42-04-02 shall not affect or defeat the right of any person to recover damages for
any injury or damage sustained by him on account of any pollution of or change
in the condition of the waters of any stream or on account of any overflow of
lands of any such person.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-03 (1983).
Effect on local ordinances. Any ordinance or resolution of any unit of local gov-
ernment that makes the operation of any agricultural operation a nuisance or
provides for the abatement thereof as a nuisance under the circumstances set
forth in this chapter is void; except that the provisions of this section shall not
apply when a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any
such agricultural operation or from an agricultural operation located within the
corporate limits of any city as of July 1, 1981.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-04 (1983).
See generally J. Patrick Wheeler, Livestock Odor & Nuisance Actions vs. "Right-to-
Farm " Laws: Report by Defendant Farmer's Attorney, 68 N.D. L. REV. 459 (1992); Neil D.
Hamilton & David Bolte, Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in the United States: A
Fifty-State Analysis, 10 J. AGRiC. TAX'N & L. 99 (1988) (providing a survey of the fifty states
with regard to right-to-farm statutes).
14. 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992).
15. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992).
16. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, "Coming to Nuisance" As a Defense or
Estoppel, 42 A.L.R. 3d 344, 346 (1972):
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tial property owner against an adjacent property owner within a
planned development which was zoned exclusively for residential
purposes. The court found that a residential property owner who
"comes to the nuisance" must meet the same "heavy burden" of
proof which the court has traditionally applied to nuisance actions
brought by residential property owners against agricultural
operations.1
7
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE NUISANCE
Public and private nuisances represent two distinct fields of
tort liability.18 The term "nuisance" comes from the French word
nuisir, meaning "to annoy."' 9 Although each field involves an ele-
ment of harm, inconvenience or annoyance to someone, each field
is otherwise unrelated.2 0  "A public nuisance is an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."2' "A
private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land." 22
The state's police power may be used to prevent and abate
nuisances "and, within constitutional limits, the legislature may
proscribe what shall constitute a nuisance and the method for the
abatement of a nuisance. '23 North Dakota defines "nuisance" as
an unlawful act which adversely affects others' health and safety or
their rights regarding the use of property, is offensive to decency,
or obstructs travel.24 "Private nuisance" is defined by the North
Where property is so utilized as to constitute a public or private nuisance, the
fact that an individual thereafter purchases or occupies property in an area
affected by the nuisance has been held or recognized in a great number of cases
not to defeat his right to its abatement or the recovery of damages due to its
continuance, since the fact alone that the complainant "came to the nuisance"
does not constitute a defense or an estoppel, nor justify the continued operation
of the nuisance.
Id.
"Priority in time as to the respective uses by plaintiff and defendant is an important
consideration, both as to the existence of a nuisance giving rise to a right to recover dam-
ages and also as to the issue of whether plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief of some kind."
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 88B at 634 (5th
ed. 1984) (citations omitted). "The matter of coming-to-the-nuisance is simply one factor on
the issue of whether or not the defendant's use is an unreasonable interference." Id. at 635.
17. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A - 840E (1977).
19. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 976 (2d ed. 1983).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (1977).
21. Id. at § 821B.
22. Id. at § 821D.
23. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 7(a) (1950).
24. Nuisance-Definition. A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act or omitting to
perform a duty, which act or omission:
1. Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others;
2. Offends decency;
538 [Vol. 69:535
1993] TILTING AT WIND TURBINES 539
Dakota Century Code as an interference with a private right of an
individual or a certain number of persons.25 The remedies against
a private nuisance are either a civil action or abatement. 6
A. PUBLIC NUISANCE
A public, or common, nuisance was originally an infringement
against the Crown of EnglandY.2  At common law, a public nui-
sance generally included crimes categorized as minor offenses,
which centered upon interference with the protected interests of
the entire community. 8 Most states have adopted statutes which
have been interpreted to include common law public nuisances.2 9
North Dakota's public nuisance statute defines a public nuisance as
one which affects an entire community, neighborhood, or any con-
siderable number of persons.30 An action for public nuisance may
be maintained by a private person only if the public nuisance is
"specially injurious to himself or his property."' 3 1 The authority to
abate a public nuisance is held by any public body or officer so
authorized by law, including municipalities32  and boards of
health.33 One who maintains or creates any public nuisance, or
who willfully omits to perform a legal duty relating to the removal
of a public nuisance, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.3 4
3. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for
passage, any lake, navigable river, bay, stream, canal, basin, public park, square,
street, or highway; or
4. In any way renders other persons insecure in life or in the use of property.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-02 (1983 & Supp. 1991). "Private Nuisance-Definition.
A private nuisance is one which affects a single individual or a determinate number of
persons in the enjoyment of some private right not common to the public." Id.
26. N. D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-03 (1983). "Private nuisance-Remedies against. The
remedies against a private nuisance are: 1. A civil action; or 2. Abatement." Id.
27. Id. at § 821B cmt. a.
28. Id. at § 821B cmt. b.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1977).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-06 (1983 & Supp. 1991). "Public nuisance-Definition.
A public nuisance is one which at the same time affects an entire community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance
or damage inflicted upon the individuals may be unequal." Id.
"[Tihe term [public nuisance] has been applied to almost all wrongs which have
interfered with rights of citizens whether in person, property, or enjoyment of property or
comfort." 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 1 (1950).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-08 (1983). "Civil action-When maintainable by a
private person. A private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance if it is
specially injurious to himself or his property, but not otherwise." Id.
32. The North Dakota Century Code confers to the governing body of a municipality
the power "[t]o declare what shall constitute a nuisance and to prevent, abate, and remove
the same." N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(44) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
33. The North Dakota Century Code confers upon the local board of health the power
to abate and remove a nuisance. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-05-04 (1991).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-15 (1983). "Maintaining public nuisance-Penalty.
Every person who maintains or commits any public nuisance, the punishment for which is
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
B. PRIVATE NUISANCE
The history of private nuisance actions indicates that the pro-
tected interests of one's use and enjoyment of land, including the
use and enjoyment of easements and profits, are the same interests
which are now protected by contemporary private nuisance stat-
utes.35 Land use is either private or public.36 If the land use is
private, the land is privileged to the individual and not to the gen-
eral public.37 For a private nuisance to be actionable, the interfer-
ence must be "specially injurious" to the individual because of its
nearness to that individual's home.3 Further, although a nuisance
may annoy many people, the nuisance does not prevent private
nuisance recovery by those living in the immediate vicinity of the
nuisance.39
C. AGRICULTURAL NUISANCE
States, including North Dakota, have long recognized the
importance of agriculture to their economies. Most state legisla-
tures have conferred special dispensation upon agricultural produ-
cers through "right-to-farm" nuisance statutes which insure that
an agricultural operation cannot be found to be a nuisance after
the farming operation has been in effect for more than one year.40
Such right-to-farm statutes have been enacted with the intent to
free farmers and livestock producers in particular, from nuisance
actions which would hinder their farming operations.4'
North Dakota's right-to-farm nuisance statute is codified in a
separate section of the state's nuisance laws.42 This statute also
includes a one year absolution from an action against the operation
as mentioned above.43
The North Dakota legislature mandated that local entities of
government were to respect the right of farmers to be free from
nuisance actions by banning any local ordinance which might
open farmers to lawsuits on nuisance claims. 4 The legislative
not otherwise prescribed, or who willfully omits to perform any legal duty relating to the
removal of a public nuisance, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. a (1977).
36. Id. at cmt. c.
37. Id.
38. 58 AM. JUR. 2D, Nuisances § 47 (1989) (citation omitted).
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 464.
41. Id. at 459.
42. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04 (1983 & Supp. 1991); see supra note 13.
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (1983). See also Wheeler, supra note 13, at 464.
44. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-04 (1983).
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intent of the agricultural nuisance statute was to give preference
to the person who had established his or her operation first. 45 Sec-
tion 42-04-04 of the North Dakota Century Code states that "[a]ny
ordinance or resolution of any unit of local government that makes
the operation of any agricultural operation a nuisance or provides
for the abatement thereof as a nuisance under the circumstances
set forth in this chapter is void ....46 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has upheld the state's agricultural nuisance laws.47
III. NUISANCE LAW AND THE NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT
A. PRE-RASSIER DECISIONS
The North Dakota Supreme Court in 1983 had before it an
appeal from a local Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association
grain elevator (hereinafter "GTA") whose operations discharged
dust, chaff and grindings upon the new and used cars and trucks of
the adjacent automobile dealer, Jerry Harmon Motors [hereinafter
"Harmon Motors"]. 48 The trial court found for the car dealer and
awarded Harmon Motors $57,620.33 in damages.49 On appeal, the
supreme court reversed the trial court, stating that Harmon
Motors failed to meet its "heavy burden" to establish that the GTA
operations were a private nuisance. 50 The court, applying the
"coming to the nuisance" doctrine in North Dakota for the first
time,5" ruled that "any individual or corporation or partnership
that comes to an alleged nuisance has a heavy burden to establish
liability."5 2
In its decision, the court clearly considered North Dakota's
newly-passed agricultural nuisance statute, 3 even though the
court could not directly and retroactively apply the statute to the
Harmon Motors facts because section 42-04 of the North Dakota
45. Agricultural Operation Not A Nuisance, 1981: Hearings on HB1461 Before the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, 47th Leg. Assembly (1981) (statement by Rep. Nichols).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-04 (1983); see supra note 13.
47. E.g., Jerry Harmon Motors v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 337 N.W.2d
427 (N.D. 1983) (recognizing that where a feed plant predated an auto dealership in the
area, and the dealership failed to identify any law that imposed a duty upon the feed plant
to refrain from emitting dust, the feed plant's activities do not constitute a nuisance); Knoff
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1986) (finding that a corporation
cannot invoke agricultural nuisance statute protections unless it meets the statutory
requirements for a farming corporation).
48. Harmon Motors, 337 N.W.2d at 428.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 431.
52. Id. at 437.
53. Harmon Motors, 337 N.W.2d at 431-32.
1993] 541
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Century Code had not been enacted by the time the suit was initi-
ated.5 4 The court noted that North Dakota's agricultural nuisance
statute "effectively protects an agricultural business or enterprise
from being declared a nuisance. It also protects a person engaged
in an agricultural business or enterprise from having it declared a
nuisance because of a change in circumstances. '55 The court
stated that the state's agricultural economy was a highly significant
factor in the interpretation of North Dakota Century Code section
42-04-02.56
The Harmon Motors court also ruled that Harmon failed to
establish how GTA omitted to perform any duty, since no law
existed which would regulate dust emissions.5" In the absence of
such a specific law, the court reasoned, Harmon had no case.58
Three years later, the supreme court had before it an appeal
from landowner Robert Knoff and his tenant, whose property was
adjacent to land owned by the American Crystal Sugar Com-
pany.5 9 American Crystal constructed three waste-water lagoons
next to Knoff's farmland. Knoff and his lessee, Thomas Heine, sub-
sequently brought a nuisance action against American Crystal for
crop losses which allegedly occurred as the result of the presence
of American Crystal's nearby lagoons.60
The Knoff trial court concluded that American Crystal's oper-
ations were "agricultural" under section 42-04-01, and that its
lagoons were not, therefore, a nuisance under section 42-04-02.1
On appeal, the supreme court distinguished between the type of
duty found in a negligence action and that which can give rise to a
nuisance claim. The court noted that "[t]he creation or mainte-
nance of a nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty, the doing of
an act which is wrongful in itself .... Nuisance is a condition, and
not an act or a failure to act, so that if a wrongful condition exists,
the person responsible for its existence is liable for resulting dam-
age to others.16 2
54. Id. The court used section 42-04-02 in order to "take a sense of direction from the
enactment." Id. at 432.
55. Id. at 431.
56. Id. The court noted that "[w]e must also consider what role the alleged nuisance
activity has with the general business activities of the community and state, which are
primarily farming and agricultural .... Grain elevators and feed-grinding businesses are
needed and support the farming and agricultural activities of this state." Id.
57. Id. at 432.
58. Harmon Motors, 337 N.W.2d at 432.
59. Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1986).
60. Id. at 315.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 317 (quoting 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 3 (1971)).
542 [Vol. 69:535
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To hold a person liable for nuisance or negligence, there must
be a breach of duty by that person.63 A person is liable for injuries
from negligence if he or she has not exercised proper care; a per-
son is liable for injuries, however, from a nuisance if he or she cre-
ates or maintains the nuisance, regardless of the care exercised.64
Nuisance law applies, rather than a negligence standard, if injuries
are a "necessary consequence" of the defendant's actions, or "inci-
dent to the business itself or the manner in which it is
conducted."
65
American Crystal argued that the court's decision in Harmon
Motors implied that "only a breach of duty imposed by statute or
regulation will support [a nuisance] action."'66 This time, however,
the supreme court rebuked any statutory argument it may have
set forth in Harmon Motors, stating that American Crystal had
interpreted Harmon Motors' ruling much too broadly.6 7 The
supreme court further noted that the plaintiff in Harmon Motors
did not prove that the defendant violated any regulation or stat-
ute; thus, the plaintiff failed to meet its "heavy burden" of estab-
lishing liability, which was necessary since Harmon Motors had
come to the alleged nuisance.68 Finally, the court stated that
"Harmon Motors does not stand for the proposition that only a vio-
lation of a statute or regulation will constitute breach of a duty
which gives rise to an action based upon nuisance."' 69 The court
remanded the case for trial on the nuisance claims.7 0
B. THE RASSIER CASE
Janet Rassier, her husband and children decided to move to
Mandan, North Dakota in the summer of 1988.71 The couple
twice inspected a certain parcel of residential property in the Ven-
tures First Addition development located in the northwest corner
of the city. The couple purchased the lot in September, 1988, and
moved a large mobile home onto the property in October, 1988.
The Rassiers noticed upon their inspections of the property that
adjacent landowner Garry Houim had erected a commercial wind
63. Id. (quoting 58 AM. JuR. 2D § 3 (1971)).
64. 39 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 4 (1942) (citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Knoff, 380 N.W.2d at 317-18.
67. Id. at 318.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 321. The parties subsequently settled out of court prior to retrial. Telephone
interview with Patrick W. Fisher, attorney for American Crystal Sugar (June 28, 1993).
71. Affidavit of Gerald Rassier at 1.
1993] 543
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turbine atop a 70 foot tower approximately ten feet from what is
now the Rassier's property line. On each of the Rassiers' prior
inspections, the wind was calm and the turbine was relatively
quiet. The Rassiers conversed with the City of Mandan's building
inspector about the property prior to their purchase. The building
inspector revealed no potential noise problems in connection with
a wind turbine of this size and kind located in a residential area. 72
Soon after they moved onto the property, the Rassiers began
to experience problems from the noise generated by the Houim
wind turbine. At trial, Rassier described the sound of the turbine
which awakened her and her family at night: ".... the wind can be
calm when you go to bed, but that's not to say it's not going to
come up in the middle of the night. And the whine will wake you
up and as the wind gusts go up and down, the whine goes up and
down along with it."73
Other problems emerged. Rassier stated that the wind tur-
bine's noise interfered with their outdoor conversation, rest and
relaxation and other normal outdoor activities around the home.74
Inside the home, the noise was often so loud that Rassier kept her
windows closed during warm weather and ran the air conditioner
which, in turn, created higher utility bills. Rassier's thirteen-year
old son, Damion, slept with earplugs to keep out the noise.75
For the next year, Rassier attempted to negotiate with the
Houims as to how the wind turbine's noise could be mitigated.7 s
No agreeable solution could be reached.
In October, 1988, James Killingbeck from the North Dakota
State Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories mea-
sured the noise levels at and around the Rassier home.7" The tests
revealed that the wind turbine created noise levels which would
be prohibited by a typical city noise abatement ordinance in either
a commercially zoned or residentially zoned area.7' Killingbeck
concluded that these noise levels could be "annoying, irritating,
stressful and may interfere with sleep. "80
72. Id. at 2.
73. Transcript of Trial at 106, Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992) (No.
16248) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
74. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 62, 65, Rassier v.
Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992) (No. 16248).
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id. at 65.
77. Plaintiff's Complaint at VIII.
78. Trial Transcript at 41-42.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Id. at 47.
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Rassier also became concerned about the structural safety of
the turbine.8 1 The 70 foot tower12 loomed above the Rassier home
approximately 40 feet from their home. 3 The turbine's propeller
reached 26 feet across.8 4 Both wind industry recommendations
and model community standards require that wind turbines be
"set back" in order that any damage resulting from a tower or
rotor failure will be incurred upon the owner's property, not an
adjacent landowner's property. 5 Rassier alleged that the develop-
ment's restrictive covenants had been violated by Houim's erec-
tion of the wind turbine in their residential area.8 6
Houim disputed Rassier's noise and safety concerns.8 7 Houim
stated that he had obtained a building permit from the City of
Mandan prior to building the wind turbine and therefore, had the
authority to erect such a wind turbine in this residential area.88
Houim claimed that he also obtained permission from those neigh-
bors potentially affected by the erection of the structure.89 Houim
stated that the Rassiers had moved to the nuisance and alleged
that Rassier had violated the development's restrictive covenants
by building a shed on her property without the covenant commit-
tee's permission,90 thus estopping Rassier from reliance upon the
restrictive covenants as a remedy for her noise and safety con-
81. Id. at 108 (stating plaintiff's concern due to ice that had formed on the turbine).
82. Id. at 72.
83. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D. 1992).
84. Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Demands to Defendant, Set
No. 1 at 1.
85. Trial Transcript at 70. At trial, the Rassiers' structural engineer expert stated that
the minimum setback from an adjacent residential property should be a minimum of one
and one half times the tower's height. Trial Transcript at 72. For a 70 foot tower like
Houim's, the setback should have been at least 105 feet away from the adjoining property.
Houim's tower is located 10 feet from the Rassier property line. Id.
86. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at V. Paragraph No. 1 of the Ventures First
Addition's restrictive covenants states that "[n]o lot, lots or portions thereof may, at any
time, be used for commercial purposes, it being specifically prescribed that the land subject
to these restrictions and conditions shall be used for residential purposes only, and no
building shall be erected thereof, except for residential purposes, except that accessory
outbuildings may be constructed insofar as they directly relate to the residential use of said
property." Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions for Blocks 1, 2 and 3 of Ventures
First Addition to the City of Mandan, North Dakota, at 1.
87. Defendant's Answer.
88. Defendant's Amended Answer at III.
89. Defendant's Trial Brief at 1. The Rassiers never claimed that the noise reached
significantly beyond their property. Consequently, they brought a private rather than a
public nuisance action. Rassier testified that "I can go out in the street and the noise from
the wind charger is nothing. I go in my yard or in my home and we get the noise there."
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 62. Rassier's psychoacoustics
expert explained at trial why the neighbors were not as affected by the noise as the Rassiers.
Trial Transcript at 28.
90. The Rassiers' construction of a small shed on their property was specifically allowed
by the covenants themselves and had been approved by the covenants committee.
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cerns.9 ' Houim requested that the nuisance action be dismissed.92
Rassier sued and sought injunctive relief.9 3 The trial court
ruled against her on the basis that the Rassiers had moved to the
nuisance and knew "full well of its presence. '94 "In addition, any
injury suffered during the pendency of this action [was] not irrepa-
rable, so as to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction."95
At trial, Rassier's noise expert confirmed the North Dakota
Health Department's measurements which showed that the noise
generated by Houim's wind turbine would violate any known typi-
cal city residential or commercial noise ordinance.96 Rassier also
argued that the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine was only one
factor among many in the determination of a private nuisance
action.97 Houim produced no expert testimony which refuted the
Rassier expert testimony as to the amount of noise generated by
the turbine. Both parties presented evidence at trial which
reflected their respective views that the local restrictive covenants
were or were not violated by either Houim or Rassier. 98
The trial court ruled in favor of Houim.99 The court stated
that "[n]othing in its operation (noise) is in violation of any law,
statute, ordinance, or regulation since there are no such legal
restrictions on noise or wind turbines."'1°  The court noted that
"[tihere exists no duty cognizable at law upon which the Plaintiff
can rest her case as to the alternative predicate in section 42-01-01
(breach of duty). The only possible duty here would be the gen-
eral duty of care [which] generally creates liability only in tort, not
nuisance." 10'
The trial court also ruled that the coming to the nuisance doc-
trine was applicable here, since Rassier was "fully aware of the
existence and noise levels of the turbine before she moved next
door."' 0 2 The court found that the covenants had been "aban-
doned by the developer" and that the subdivision members had
ignored the control committee's authority to enforce the restric-
91. Defendant's Trial Brief at 6.
92. Defendant's Answer and Amended Answer.
93. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
94. Trial Court's Order Denying Injunctive Relief at 1.
95. Id.
96. Trial Transcript at 21, 24.
97. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 7.
98. Trial transcript at 84, 126.
99. Judgment and Decree of Trial Court at 1.
100. Id at 2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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tive covenants rendering the covenants ineffective.10 3  Rassier
appealed the trial court decision. 10 4
C. THE RASSIER DECISION
On appeal, Rassier argued that the trial court erroneously con-
cluded as a matter of law that the noise and dangers created by
Houim's commercial wind turbine did not constitute a private nui-
sance under North Dakota Century Code sections 42-01-01(1) and
(4).105
Houim responded that the Rassier family had purchased their
Ventures First Addition property two years after Houim had
erected his commercial wind turbine, and that Houim had
received a permit from the City of Mandan to put up the tur-
bine. 10 Houim admitted that the 70-foot tower was located ten
feet from the Rassiers' property line and forty feet from the
Rassiers' dwelling.' 07  Houim claimed that the lawsuit was initi-
ated by Rassier only after the relationship between the Rassiers
and Houims began to deteriorate 0 8 and that Rassier's arguments
as to the violation of the development's restrictive covenants and
the turbine's safety were unavailing. 10 9
1. Statutory Duty of Care
Rassier claimed the duty of care as expressly provided in
North Dakota Century Code sections 42-01-01(1) and (4) applied to
Rassier's nuisance claim against Houim even though there was no
other express law or regulation upon which Rassier's claim was
based. 1 Houim argued, as did American Crystal in Knoff, that
103. Id.
104. Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal.
105. Appellant's Brief at i. Rassier claimed that the fact that the city of Mandan had
not specifically provided for noise regulation does not estop Rassier's claim for relief under
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01. Id. Rassier also claimed that ice thrown from a wind turbine
blade or a potential tower collapse were substantial health and safety risks created by the
wind turbine's presence, and are actionable under N. D. Cent. Code § 42-01-01(4). Id.
Rassier argued that the duty of care which gives rise to a claim of nuisance, whether
grounded in tort or negligence, is nonetheless applicable to Houim's conduct in the
maintenance of a private nuisance. Id. Rassier also argued that the fact that she came to
the nuisance did not override her claim for relief, and that Houim's erection of his
commercial wind turbine violated Ventures First Addition's restrictive covenants which
governed the parties' residential development. Id. at ii. See supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
106. Appellee's Brief at 4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 5-6. Houim claimed that the covenants control committee was not valid,
and his wind turbine tower was stronger than that recommended for a wind turbine
generator of the size owned by Houim. Id.
110. Appellant's Brief at 4.
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only a breach of duty established by statute or regulation will sup-
port a nuisance claim."'
The court's majority agreed with Houim. Justice Gerald
VandeWalle, writing for the majority, noted that the statutory
duty of care found in North Dakota Century Code section 42-01-
01 is explicit," 2 and that the common law "remains relevant"
when one assesses whether omitting to perform a duty which
"(a)nnoys, injures, [or] endangers... others is a nuisance .... "113
Even though Houim's duty of care was clearly set forth as a duty
cognizable and imposed at law, the court concluded that the viola-
tion of one's statutory duty of care is not enough for another to
sustain a private nuisance action.
The majority opinion noted that the trial court's conclusion
that Houim had "no duty cognizable at law upon which [Rassier]
can rest her case"' " 4 was apparently based on the supreme court's
earlier statements in Harmon Motors "that the plaintiff's failure to
identify a duty imposed by law was significant."' 5 The majority
opinion referred to the court's earlier holding in Knoff, wherein
the supreme court rejected appellee American Crystal's argument
that only a statutory breach of duty could create a nuisance action,
and stated that American Crystal had read Harmon Motors much
too broadly.1 6
Unfortunately, neither the Harmon Motors court nor the
Rassier majority opinion spelled out whether the corollary was
true-that a nuisance action could be sustained absent the viola-
tion of an express statute, regulation or ordinance. The Rassier
majority opinion cited the Harmon Motors court's admonition
against the statutory argument and then concluded, without fur-
ther explanation, that
[w]e construe the decision of the trial court in this case as
complying with this explanation in Knoff of our opinion in
Jerry Harmon Motors. The Memorandum Opinion and
Order for Judgment indicates that the court engaged in a
weighing of the circumstances, stating as a basis for deny-
111. Defendant's Trial Brief at 5. In Knoff, appellee American Crystal contended that
the court's decision in Harmon Motors "implie[d] that only a breach of a duty imposed by
statute or regulation will support an action for nuisance." Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 317-18 (N.D. 1986). The court rejected American Crystal's argument,
stating that American Crystal had read Harmon Motors "much too broadly." Id. at 318.
112. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d at 635, 637 (N.D. 1992).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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ing Rassier's claim the fact that she "came to the
nuisance."1
17
The Rassier court's reference to its earlier Knoff holding
would seem to imply that the trial court in Rassier was wrong
when it concluded that the statutory duty of care found in section
42-01-01 was not a duty cognizable at law. Even though Houim's
duty of care was found to be clearly set forth by statute, the
supreme court nonetheless required Rassier to show that Houim
violated another statute in order to sustain her private nuisance
action. Thus, the majority affirmed the trial court's ruling in a 3-2
decision. 118
Justices Herbert L. Meschke concurred and dissented, and
was joined by Justice Beryl J. Levine. 1 9 While Justice Meschke
agreed with the majority that "there is an absolute duty not to act
in a way that unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment
of the property of other persons" under North Dakota Century
Code section 42-02-01, he also stated that the "absolute duty is not
dependent upon violation of any other express law, ordinance, or
regulation."' 120 Consequently, "Justice VandeWalle's analysis thus
demonstrates that the trial court's conclusion, that '[n]othing in
[the] operation [noise] of [Houim's wind turbine] is in violation of
any law, statute, ordinance or regulation since there are no such
legal restrictions on noise or wind turbines,' was unsound.'1 2'
Justice Meschke noted that the majority approved the trial
court's ruling despite "the trial court's contorted conclusion that
'there exists no duty cognizable at law upon which [Rassier] can
rest her case as to' a breach of duty.' 122 He disputed the majority
opinion's indication that the trial court properly weighed the cir-
cumstances of the case and properly found that Houim did not
unreasonably interfere with Rassier's use of her property. 23
Justice Meschke pointed out that "[e]xcessive noise is a classic
breach of duty, and it is a private nuisance to a neighbor in a resi-
dential area."'1 24 He noted that in a similar wind turbine case from
New Jersey, the New Jersey court stated that "the ability to look to
one's home as a refuge from the noise and stress associated with
117. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638.
118. Id. at 639.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 639.
123. Id. at 638.
124. Id. at 640.
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the outside world is a right to be jealously guarded. Before that
right can be eroded in the name of social progress, the benefit to
society must be clear and the intrusion must be warranted under
all of the circumstances. ' 125  Justice Meschke noted that when
Houim installed his wind generator, all Ventures First Addition
lots, including the Houim and Rassier lots, were subdivided and
zoned for residential purposes and protected by recorded cove-
nants which restricted use to residential purposes only and prohib-
ited all commercial use. 126
Justice Meschke quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
explanation that one of the most important factors to be weighed
in a nuisance action is the locality's character at the time that the
interfering activity is begun.'2 7 In this case, he said, when Houim
erected his wind turbine, all lots in Ventures First Addition were
intended for residential purposes.12  Justice Meschke noted that
he would have reversed and remanded the trial court's decisions
so that a decision could be rendered with a correct view of private
nuisance law. 129
2. "Coming to the Nuisance" Doctrine
Houim claimed Rassier came to the nuisance, a charge undis-
puted by Rassier. 13 0 Houim also claimed that the Harmon Motors'
"heavy burden" of proof must be met by Rassier even though the
Harmon Motors facts dealt with an agricultural nuisance, not a nui-
sance in a residentially zoned area. 13 1
Rassier countered that coming to the nuisance could not alone
125. Id. (quoting Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1383 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982)).
126. Id.
127. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 640. Meschke quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
position:
Even between socially desirable and valuable uses of land there is a degree of
incompatibility that, in some cases, is so great that they cannot be carried on in
the same locality. A slaughterhouse, for example, may be indispensable to the
community, but it usually renders other land in its immediate vicinity unfit for
residential use and enjoyment. This incompatibility between the various
beneficial uses to which land may be put has, in nearly all communities, resulted
in a segregation of certain uses in certain localities in order to avoid unnecessary
conflict between those that are highly incompatible. Thus some localities come
to be devoted primarily to residential purposes, others to industrial purposes,
others to agricultural purposes and so on. Sound public policy demands that the
land in each locality be used for purposes suited to the character of that locality
and that persons desiring to make a particular use of land should make it in a
suitable locality.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 827 cmt. on Clause 9d (1977)).
128. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 640.
129. Id. at 641.
130. Appellee's Brief at 7.
131. Id.
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override her claim for relief, citing both the majority rule and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts 3 1 for the proposition that coming
to the nuisance is but one factor and not sufficient in and of itself to
bar a claim for relief.13 3  Rassier also argued that Houim should
have expected that the residential lot adjoining his own would be
settled and that the wind turbine which he erected on his own
property could subsequently become an actionable nuisance when
the adjacent property was developed.1 4  The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts provides: "The fact that the plaintiff has acquired or
improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it has come
into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar his action, but it is a
132. Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
In determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are important:
(a) the extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1977).
Section 828 of the Restatement further states:
In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional invasion of
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are
important:
(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the
conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
Id. at § 828 (1977). See also supra note 4.
133. Appellant's Brief at 14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D cmt b
(1977)).
134. See also Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876) (finding that "[o]ne cannot
erect a nuisance upon his land adjoining vacant lands owned by another and thus
measurably control the uses to which his neighbor's land may in the future be subjected");
Hall v. Budde, 169 S.W.2d 33 (1943) (finding no prescriptive right to operate a public
nuisance); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 76 P. 513 (1904) (enjoining the defendant from leasing
property to be used as houses of ill repute).
For additional discussion, see T.C. Williams, Annotation, "Coming to a Nuisance" as a
Defense or Operating as an Estoppel, 167 A.L.R. 1364 (1947). In Hall v. Budde, Williams
recognized that:
A person acquiring property has the right to expect and require that his
neighbor will utilize his property, notwithstanding its previous use, so as to not
interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of his own, and that at most, the fact
that the complainant "moved to the nuisance" was but a factor, though an
important one, to be considered in connection with all the circumstances in
determining the equities of a given case.
Id. at 1382. Williams also commented that in Ingersoll v. Rousseau:
The "fact that the defendant began making this particular use of his property
before the plaintiffs purchased their property did not affect the [nuisance action]
.... The right of the [plaintiffs] to maintain an injunction, if that right exists at
all, is a property right; it runs with the land.., and existed in favor of the grant-
ors of the [plaintiffs], and passed to them by the purchase of the property."
Id. at 1372.
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factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is
actionable. 13 5 Within this context, comment b to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts states further:
The rule generally accepted by the courts is that in itself
and without other factors the "coming to the nuisance"
will not bar the plaintiff's recovery. Otherwise the
defendant by setting up an activity or condition that
results in the nuisance could condemn all the land in his
vicinity to a servitude without paying any compensation,
and so could arrogate to himself a good deal of the value
of the adjoining land. The defendant is required to con-
template and expect the possibility that the adjoining
land may be settled, sold or otherwise transferred and
that a condition originally harmless may result in an
actionable nuisance when there is later development.3 '
The majority opinion sided with Houim. Without distinguish-
ing the residential nature of the Rassier nuisance claim against the
clearly agricultural nature of the nuisance action in Harmon
Motors, the majority noted that the Harmon Motors court con-
strued the coming to the nuisance doctrine as placing "a heavy
burden to establish liability" upon the nuisance claimant who has
moved to the nuisance. 137 The majority then ruled that this bur-
den was not met by Rassier. 131 The majority did acknowledge
Rassier's testimony from two noise experts-unchallenged by
expert testimony from Houim139-that Houim's wind turbine gen-
erated noise up to 69 decibels, a per se violation of those North
Dakota community noise ordinances which restrict noise in resi-
dentially zoned areas.' 40 Nonetheless, the majority opinion was
not convinced that the trial court mistakenly found that Rassier
had not proved a nuisance. 14 The majority opinion noted that the
trial court "included the necessary finding that Houim did not
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1977).
136. Id. at cmt. b (emphasis added).
137. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D. 1992).
138. Id.
139. Appellant's Brief at 10.
140. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638.
141. Id. at 638-39. The court noted that there were other relevant factors to be
considered which relate to the reasonableness of a defendant's interference with a
plaintiff's use of property. These factors include "a balancing of the utility of defendant's
conduct against the harm to the plaintiff, plaintiff's attempts to accommodate defendant's
use before bringing the nuisance action, and plaintiff's lack of diligence in seeking relief."
Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 639 (relying on 5 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, THE
LAW ON REAL PROPERTY, 704[2]-704[3] (1991)).
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unreasonably interfere with Rassier's use of her property. 142
In his dissent, Justice Meschke stated that the court's earlier
decision in Harmon Motors applied the coming to the nuisance
doctrine in a distinctly agricultural and commercial context, not
residential.' 43 He noted that "'[tihe rationale for the prevailing
rule rejecting 'coming to the nuisance' as a sufficient defense is
that otherwise those who settled in an area would acquire com-
plete control over the future of adjoining and nearby land, and the
fluidity of land use-a basic aspect of the American economy-
would be reduced."' 44 Justice Meschke noted that in this case
there was planned development, and Houim knew that the resi-
dential lot adjacent to his was intended for a home.14 5 He stated
that the trial court improperly applied the coming to the nuisance
doctrine to this clearly residential set of circumstances and had
mistakenly concluded, therefore, that Rassier's private nuisance
action failed as a result. 146
IV. NORTH DAKOTA LAW AFTER RASSIER V. HOUIM
It is reasonable to conclude from the Rassier decision that one
who claims a private nuisance action should not rely solely upon
the statutory remedies expressly provided for such actions by
North Dakota Century Code section 42-01-03. Although the
majority recognized one's "absolute" and statutorily defined duty
not to unreasonably interfere with another's enjoyment and use of
property,147 the court appeared to find it significant that no other
express statute, ordinance or regulation had been violated. 148 Sec-
ond, and perhaps more ominous for residential property owners
and local units of government alike, it is unclear from the Harmon
Motors and Rassier decisions how significant a statutory violation
might be in future nuisance decisions for plaintiffs to prevail, and
how specifically tailored the statute must be to the nature of the
nuisance allegation in order to be enforceable.
A rose is a rose, and an absolute duty of care in a private nui-
142. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638.
143. Id. at 640. "While that [coming to the nuisance] factor is no doubt important to
protecting an agricultural industry in an agricultural state, it should not be applied to an
inappropriate activity that interferes with the use of property planned, zoned, and
dedicated to residential purposes." Id.
144. Id. at 641 (quoting 5 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, THE LAW ON
REAL PROPERTY, 9 704[3], at 64-48 to 64-49 (1991)).
145. Id. at 641.
146. Id. at 640-41.
147. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 637.
148. Id.
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sance action in a residential context should be absolute, not rela-
tive as in a negligence action.149 Both the Rassier majority and
dissent agree that North Dakota Century Code section 42-01-01
expressly forbids one to omit to perform a duty which act or omis-
sion unreasonably interferes with another's quiet enjoyment of
property.150 This duty of care becomes a relative rather than abso-
lute duty, however, when a court imposes this duty only after it
first weighs all of the circumstances to determine whether the
plaintiff has a claim for relief. While this relative duty may be
appropriate when applied in an agricultural context, such a duty is
less appropriate in a residential setting.
In Rassier, the court imposed a relative rather than absolute
duty of care upon Houim not to interfere with Rassier's quiet
enjoyment of her property. The court watered down Houim's
"absolute" duty in favor of a weaker, relative duty which appar-
ently would be imposed only after the trial court first weighed all
the circumstances, such as whether Rassier came to the nuisance.
Only after the trial court weighed the circumstances did the court
find that Houim's level of care did not unreasonably interfere with
Rassier's exercise of her property rights.
If a trial court considers the duty of care in a residential nui-
sance action only after weighing all the circumstances, the result
can be a contorted conclusion such as that in Rassier, where a com-
mercial wind turbine, located in a residential zone, which pro-
duces more noise than that allowed even in a commercially zoned
area-clearly a nuisance by any objective standard-is not seen as
an "unreasonable" interference because of other factors weighed
first by the trial court.'' Such a result is scarce comfort to a resi-
dential property owner, present or future, who must deal with the
reality of a bona fide nuisance but with no legal recourse to abate
the nuisance.
Since it appears that after Rassier it is significant if no express
statute or regulation has been violated other than the duty of care
found in section 42-01-01, it remains unclear how specifically tai-
lored this statute must be in order that the plaintiff can find relief
under the same.
In earlier decisions, the court often cited the lack of a specific
statute as a basis for denying relief to the claimant. In Langer v.
149. Id. at 637.
150. See id. at 639.
151. Id.
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Goode,152 the defendant was accused of maintaining a nuisance
because he failed to destroy wild mustard, the seed of which alleg-
edly blew onto the plaintiff's property. The Langer court reached
into contract law and chose one of the three definitions of "unlaw-
ful," found in what is now North Dakota Century Code section 9-
08-01.111 The Langer court declared that no duty devolved upon
the defendant since there was no duty prescribed by law which
required the defendant to destroy the weeds on his own prop-
erty. 5 4 The court chose not to employ subsection 2 of the statute,
which would have allowed the court to deem the defendant's
omission of duty unlawful as "contrary to the policy of express law,
though not expressly prohibited .... 155
In Harmon Motors, the court noted that the plaintiff, which
had chaff and grain dust fall upon its car lot from the nearby grain
elevator, did not establish a breach of a required duty by the
defendant.' 5 6 Further, the court stated that it knew of no law
which regulated dust emissions. 15 7 Likewise, in Rassier, where the
city had no wind turbine noise abatement ordinance and the
Rassier family discovered the effects of an adjacent wind turbine's
noise only after living upon their property over a period of time,
the court found it significant that no express law which governs
wind turbines was violated.' 58
The court appears to require that the plaintiff who brings a
nuisance action must be able to sue upon a statute specifically
designed for such a nuisance before a court will grant relief. This
requirement does not bode well for the plaintiff who encounters a
novel nuisance which, although clearly defined as a nuisance by
virtue of its annoyance, injury or unreasonable interference with
another's property, has yet to be specifically regulated by the legis-
lature, municipality, county commission or state agency.
The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine has now been applied
by the North Dakota court in a distinctly residential rather than
152. 131 N.W. 258 (N.D. 1911).
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-01 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
"Provisions that are unlawful. Any provision of a contract is unlawful if it is:
1. Contrary to an express provision of law;
2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited, or
3. Otherwise contrary to good morals."
Id. (emphasis added).
154. Langer, 131 N.W. at 261.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-01 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
156. Harmon Motors v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n., 337 N. W. 2d 427, 432
(N.D. 1983).
157. Id.
158. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W. 2d 635, 639 (N.D. 1992).
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agricultural context.' 59 After the Rassier decision, it is arguable
that a residential property owner who discovers that he or she
lives under the yoke of a nuisance will not be able to sustain an
action against it unless the property owner meets a "heavy bur-
den" of proof traditionally applied to agricultural nuisance actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The supreme court noted in Rassier that one's absolute duty of
care in a nuisance claim is the absolute duty not to unreasonably
interfere with other persons' use and enjoyment of their prop-
erty.16 0 The court earlier mitigated this absolute duty of care in
agricultural contexts in which the legislature clearly wished to pro-
tect the economic interests of the state's farmers from nuisance
actions. 16' Although the Rassier court did not specifically rule that
a nuisance action can be sustained only if an express statute, regu-
lation, or ordinance is violated in addition to the statutory duty of
care, it is arguable that, for all practical purposes, the "heavy bur-
den" which the court now applies to the residential property
owner who moves to the nuisance has to meet such a requirement.
The supreme court has readily granted protection to agricul-
tural operations from private nuisance actions brought by claim-
ants who have "moved to the nuisance." The court has ample
statutory underpinnings for doing so.' 62 The Rassier court, how-
ever, apparently extended the "heavy burden" required to prove
an agricultural nuisance to a private nuisance action brought by
one residential property owner who moves to an adjacent residen-
tial property owner's nuisance, in a development zoned for resi-
dential purposes only.16 3
The application of this "heavy burden" to residential private
nuisance actions creates a harsh new standard for residential prop-
erty owners and lacks the sound statutory basis upon which the
burden was originally determined under North Dakota's agricul-
tural nuisance statutes. The court set forth proper public policy
when it protected agricultural land use from nuisance actions in
past decisions.1 6 4 As the Restatement notes, however, "[s]ound
public policy demands that the land in each locality be used for
159. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 6.
160. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 637.
161. Harmon Motors, 337 N.W.2d at 431.
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
163. See generally Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W. 2d 635 (N.D. 1992).
164. See generally supra note 47 and accompanying text.
556 [Vol. 69:535
TILTING AT WIND TURBINES
purposes suited to the character of that locality . . ,. . One's
residential home and property are also deserving of similar land
use protection against nuisances, especially if the benefits of a nui-
sance are small, but with substantial irritation.' 66
The court may wish to distinguish the duty of care applied to a
residential private nuisance from a nuisance found in an agricul-
tural setting. One's duty not to create or maintain a nuisance
should be far greater when one lives in a residentially zoned area
where people relax, sleep, and otherwise take refuge from the
noise and stress of the outside world.' 67 In an agricultural context,
on the other hand, the court has properly invoked the legisla-
tively-mandated protection of the farmer's economic interests
when determining whether a nuisance exists. The legislature has
not protected the economic interests of the residential property
owner who creates or maintains a nuisance on city land zoned
exclusively for residential purposes. Residential property owners
deserve more protection from a private nuisance than that which
is now provided under the court's present interpretation of North
Dakota's nuisance law.
165. See supra note 20.
166. See Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1383 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
167. Id.
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